

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /031 W

----- 083615

Z 222235Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4368

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ATHENS 4812

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU, GR

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: GREEK CONCERNS REGARDING TURKISH FAILURE

TO OBSERVE CEASEFIRE

1. AFTER I HAD LEFT AIRPORT AND AS SECRETARY SISCO'S PLANE HAD JUST TAXIED TO END OF RUNWAY PRIOR TO TAKEOFF URGENT CALL WAS RECEIVED FROM PM'S OFFICE TO EFFECT HE AND FM WISHED TO MEET AGAIN WITH SISCO. PLANE WAS CALLED BACK AND I RETURNED TO AIRPORT, WHICH TIME SISCO SPOKE DIRECTLY WITH PM ON TELEPHONE.

2. PM EXPRESSED DEEP GREEK CONCERN THAT TURKS NOT OBSERVING CEASEFIRE, WERE CONTINUING TO BRING IN NEW MATERIEL AND REINFORCEMENTS ANDWERE STILL BOMBING. SISCO EXPLAINED THAT GOG MUST EXPECT SOME INITIAL PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING CEASEFIREAND PROMISED PM THAT US WOULD DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO SEE THAT ALL CONCERNED OBSERVED IT. HE TOLD PM I WOULD IMMEDIATELY GET IN TOUCH WITH STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER TO ASK FOR STATUS OF CEASEFIRE AND ANY INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE REGARDING TURKISH VIOLATIONS. HE POINTED OUT RESPONSIBILITIES OF UN FOR IMPLEMENTING AND SUPERVISING CEASEFIRE AND PROMISED HE WOULD PERSONALLY CALL SYG WALDHEIM TOMORROW MORNING AFTER HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON. HE ALSO GAVE PM HIS WASHINGTON TELEPHONE NUMBER AND TOLD HIM TO CALL HIM DIRECTLY AT ANY TIME.

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3. I ALSO SPOKE WITH PM BY TELEPHONE AND

AT THIS REQUEST WENT TO THIS OFFICE FROM THE AIRPORT. BEFORE LEAVING AIRBASE HOWEVER I TELEPHONED OPERATIONS CENTER TO CARRY OUT FIRST STEP SISCO HAD PROMISED SO THAT I WOULD HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION I MIGHT USE IN MY CONVERSATION WITH PM. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, I INDICATED HOPE THAT USUN COULD GIVE US DAILY REPORTS ON STATUS OF CEASEFIRE TO USE AS APPROPRIATE WITH GOG

4. PM AND FM KYPREOS RECEIVED ME AND A/DCM IMMEDIATELY. AT OUTSET I EXPLAINED I HAD JUST TELEPHONED WASHINGTON AND HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT SECRETARY HAD ALREADY EMPHASIZED US CONCERN REGARDING NECESSITY FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF CEASEFIRE TO UNSYG. MOREOVER I HAD FOUND THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUFFUM WAS ON TELEPHONE TO AMBASSADOR MACOMBER IN ANKARA TO INSTRUCT HIM TO IMPRESS UPON TURKS ONCE AGAIN URGENCY OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF CEASEFIRE. I TOLD HIM ALSO THAT EMBASSY WOULD BE RECEIVING CURRENT REPORTS FROM USUN ON WAY IN WHICH CEASEFIRE BEING IMPLEMENTED.

5. PM BEGAN BY EXPRESSING HIS DEEP CONCERN AT PRESENT SITUATION. GOG WAS IN VERY DIFFICULT POSITION BECAUSE FROM US ASSURANCES IT HAD FIRST BELIEVED CEASEFIRE COULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS; THEN IT HAD BEEN DEFERRED AND TIME SET FOR TWO P.M. ATHENS TIME TODAY; AND NOW AFTER CEASEFIRE WAS TO BEGIN AT FOUR P.M. IT STILL WAS NOT BEING OBSERVED. TURKS HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF TIME ON FIRST TWO OCCASIONS BUT NOW ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY SHOULD STOP IMMEDIATELY AND COMPLETELY. ON CONTRARY AND BEYOND COMPREHENSION WAS FACT THAT TURKS WERE STILL ENGAGED IN BOMBING, BRINGING IN NEW MATERIEL AND IN HEAVY FIGHTING IN CERTAIN AREAS. I INTERJECTED THERE WERE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND THERE WERE BOUND TO BE SOME INCIDENTS, BUT I THOUGHT WE MUST RECOGNIZE CERTAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN GETTING EVERYTHING IN PERFECT ORDER AT ONCE. PM RESPONDED THAT "HELL IS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS" BUT HE DID NOT EVEN CREDIT TURKS WITH THEM. TURKEY WAS VIOLATING ITS PROMISES AND GOG WAS ENTITLED TO ASK WHETHER, WHEN
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AND IF PARTIES SAT DOWN TOGETHER FOR DISCUSSIONS AND TURKS CONTINUED TO ACT IN THIS WAY ANY RESULTS WOULD BE EXPECTED. HE RETURNED TO POINT OF CONTINUED TURKISH MILITARY ACTIVITY, THIS TIME MENTIONING USE OF TANKS AND EXPRESSED HOPE TURKS WOULD STOP BUT WARNED THAT IF THEY DID NOT GREEKS WOULD EITHER "GO THERE WITH MATERIEL AND MEN OR TRY TO STOP THEM BY OUR OWN MEANS". HE EMPHASIZED THAT "THERE IS NO

THIRD COURSE" AND SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE. I SAID THERE
WAS A THIRD COURSE WHICH WAS AN ALL OUT EFFORT BY ALL
CONCERNED TO MAKE THE UN SUPERVISION OF THE CEASE FIRE
EFFECTIVE. HE ASKED WHO WILL CONVINCE YOUNGER GREEK OFFICERS
AND BE ABLE TO TELL THEM THINGS DEVELOPED IN RIGHT
WAY IF SITUATION ON ISLAND CONTINUED AND WHAT COULD
BE SAID TO THEM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT GREEKS DID NOT
RELY ON TURKISH PROMISES BUT ON WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER
HAD SAID DIRECTLY TO THEM IN HIS TELEPHONE CALLS AND
ON "HONOR AND STRENGTH" OF U.S. HE AGAIN SAID
THAT IF US COULD NOT STOP ALL THIS TURKISH MISCHIEF GOG
WOULD DO SOMETHING ELSE.

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ACTION SS-30

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Z 222235Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4369

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6. PM REPEATED THAT GOG WAS IN SERIOUS SITUATION.
AFTER FOUR P.M. WHEN CEASEFIRE WENT INTO EFFECT IT
HAD TO DRAW A LINE. I VOLUNTEERED TO CHECK
SITUATION DIRECTLY WITH AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN NICOSIA
AND TOLD PM AND FM THAT I KNEW OUR AMBASSADOR IN NICOSIA
WAS FOLLOWING SITUATION CLOSELY. THEY INDICATED THEY
WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HIS ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION
AND AT MY SUGGESTION AGREED TO PUT IN TELEPHONE
CALL. KYPREOS INTERJECTED THAT WHILE GOG PREPARED
FOR TALKS IN GENEVA IT WAS GOING NOWHERE UNLESS
CEASEFIRE EFFECTIVE. HE HAD TOLD FOREIGN SECRETARY
CALLAGHAN PRECISELY THIS WHEN LATTER HAD TELEPHONED
HIM. I TOLD HIM US WANTED BOTH TO SEE CEASEFIRE
FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED AND DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY
WITH OBJECTIVE OF RESTORING PEACE IN CYPRUS.

7. PM SAID SITUATIONS MAY BE BEYOND INDIVIDUAL CONTROL, OBSERVING STUDENTS OF HISTORY FREQUENTLY MADE THIS POINT. I RESPONDED THAT THIS APPLIED TO HISTORY BUT AS LONG AS WE WERE ALIVE WE MUST TRY TO MAKE THINGS WORK. HIS ANSWER WAS THAT FACTS ARE FACTS AND THINGS CAN BE STRONGER THAN INDIVIDUALS. I REASSURED HIM THAT US REALIZED HOW IMPORTANT CEASEFIRE WAS, EMPHASIZING UNUSUAL STEP INVOLVED US IN TAKING INITIATIVE TO BRING IT ABOUT. I SAID HE COULD BE SURE US WOULD MAKE ALL OUT EFFORT TO INSURE ITS EFFECTIVENESS. I REMINDED HIM IT WAS A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC RESOLUTION AND THAT UNFYCIP WAS ALREADY

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THERE, EXPREIENCED AND FAMILIAR WITH TERRAIN.

8. PM ASSURED ME STRICT ORDERS HAD BEEN GIVEN GREEK MILITARY TO COMPLY ONE HUNDRED PERCENT WITH AGREEMENT. IN THE FACE OF THIS, TURKISH VIOLATIONS NOT ACCEPTABLE. HE ALSO RAISED QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVE ACTION BUT DID NOT KNOW WHAT FORM IT MIGHT TAKE. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD TO RETURN TO REASON, PATIENCE WAS NEEDED, AND WE MUST EXPECT INITIAL DIFFICULTIES. HIS ANSWER WAS THAT IT TOOK TWO PARTIES TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT AND TURKS SIMPLY WERE NOT LIVING UP TO AGREEMENT. I INTERJECTED THAT OUR AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA HAD REPORTED TURKS WANTED CEASEFIRE TO SUCCEED AND AGAIN RETURNED TO POINT THAT I KNEW BOTH UN AND US WOULD BE MAKING GREAT EFFORT IN ANKARA AND ON ISLAND WITH TURKS.

9. AT THIS POINT IN CONVERSATION TELEPHONE CALL TO NICOSIA CAME THROUGH AND I REVIEWED SITUATION WITH AMBASSADOR DAVIES. JUST BEFORE THEN KYPREOS TALKED WITH SAMPSON AND CYPRIOT FM WHO APPARENTLY CONFIRMED THAT CONSIDERABLE FIGHTING WAS STILL IN PROGRESS. AFTER I COMPLETED MY CONVERSATION I TOLD THEM THAT AMBASSADOR DAVIES HAD INDICATED SITUATION HAD BEEN DIFFICULT BUT WAS RELATIVELY QUIET AT TIME OF CALL ALTHOUGH SOME FIGHTING WAS CONTINUING. I CONCLUDED THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO MAKE CEASEFIRE SUCCEED, AGREED IT WAS NOT AN EASY TASK BUT REPEATED WE MUST MAKE IT SUCCEED AND I BELEIVED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO.

10. I TOLD PM HE SHOULD FEEL FREE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AT ANY TIME. HE REMAINED PESSEMISTIC, AND I SENSED THAT ALTHOUGH SOME OF HIS PESSIMISM WAS A REFLECTION OF FATIGUE ITS ROOTS WERE DEEP AND HISTORICALLY BASED GREEK SUSPICION AND MISTRUST OF TURKS. AS WE DEPARTED I AGAIN ASSURED HIM

THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING WE COULD WITH UN
AND GOT TO MAKE CEASEFIRE WORK.

11. IN MY JUDGMENT WE FACE SOME VERY DIFFICULT DAYS
AND IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL FOR ME TO HAVE AS FULL
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INFORMATION AS I CAN REGARDING EFFORTS OF UN TO
IMPLEMENT CEASEFIRE AND OUR OWN EFFORTS WITH TURKS
TO SAME END.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMISTICE, TREATY VIOLATION, TREATY COMPLIANCE, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, COMBAT OPERATIONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 JUL 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: elyme
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATHENS04812
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740197-1109
From: ATHENS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740730/aaaaazku.tel
Line Count: 238
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: elyme
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15 MAY 2002 by ifshinsr>; APPROVED <25-Sep-2002 by elyme>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CYPRUS: GREEK CONCERNS REGARDING TURKISH FAILURE TO OBSERVE CEASEFIRE
TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU, GR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005